Chapter III

Religion and Politics in Ghana:
An Historical Overview

In this chapter, I argue that the distinction between religion and culture is almost impossible to draw in traditional Ghanaian society. Because of this, basic assumptions that Ghanaians make about the nature of human collectivities, the nature of societal interaction, and the desired relationship between leaders and led are based on religion. As previously mentioned, religion served as an integrative force for Kwame Nkrumah in his attempt to unite the country under a new leadership within a modern political system. Through the institution of chieftaincy, Nkrumah sought to give a traditional foundation to the development of a new political culture. *Ghanaman* or the State of Ghana became part of the vocabulary of Ghanaians. Nkrumah gradually assumed the role of *omanhene* (king of state). Through his employment of Ghana's hallowed tradition, therefore, a form of civil religion emerged.[1]

Some Perspectives on African Religions

African religions have been denigrated by Western scholars over the years. Therefore, even when scholars perceive the important role of religion in African life, they still tend to attach negative connotations.

Chancellor Williams is a good example of racist and ethnocentric judgment:

> Some African religious values will, by any unbiased appraisal, stand co-equal with those of the world's great religions. Encrusted around these wonderful values, however, are beliefs and practices of savagery and ignorance which have become institutionalized as an essential part of the Africans' tradition and culture.[2]

This comment also offers an example of what Mudimbe[3] calls "epistemological ethnocentricism" which assumes that the western observer is equipped with superior morals and culture, and that the people observed have inferior morals and culture.

Geertz would reject Williams' assessment, for such an ethnocentric view does not encourage entry into other people's valley in order to converse with them. For Geertz religion is one of the subsystems in every culture that helps people to combat chaos and meaninglessness.

> A synopsis of cosmic order, a set of religious beliefs, is also a gloss upon the mundane world of social relationships and psychological events. It renders them graspable. But more than gloss, such beliefs are also a template. They do not merely interpret social and psychological processes in cosmic terms—in which case they would be philosophical—but they shape them.... More, it is a matter of understanding how it is that man's notions, however implicit, of the "really real" and the dispositions these notions induce in them, color their sense of the reasonable, the practical, the humane, and the moral.[4]

With his work among the indigenous people of Central Africa, James Fernandez also offers another view about the place of religion in African life and thought:

> For religion..., has the particular power to reconcile past and present, the corporeal and the social, the I and the other. It is, through the sign-images that it employs, 'internuncial' between the past and the present of the society which institutionalizes it and the past and present of the corporeal individual who participates in it.[5]

Religious symbols of a people directly relate to how they deal with existential and ultimate concerns. In the face of the inevitable irrationalities of life such as death, poverty, and injustice, symbol systems that undergird the crisis points of life are crucial for institutional

maintenance and for life as a whole. Religion helps to deal with the question, why? Christopher Dawson accurately describes African life and thought when he describes African culture as a "theogamy, a coming together of the divine and the human within the limits of a sacred tradition."[6]

Religion and Political Change in Ghanaian Tradition

The word "religion" has no direct equivalent in the Twi language, my point of reference. *Som* or worship is usually a suffix: *Onyamesom* (the worship of God) or *Abosomsom* (the worship of gods perjoratively called fetishism or animism) are the commonest expressions in Ghana. Religion is taken for granted in Ghanaian life and thought. It is an intricate part of life.

One of the key issues to consider is whether religion is merely a conservative force in Ghanaian life, or whether it has its own internal dynamic that offers arenas for change as well as continuity. To deal with this question I intend to lift up some historical epochs from the history of Ashanti, 1799 to 1850, and 1870 to 1890 to illustrate (1) the symbolic and integrative capacities of Ghanaian religiosity and (2) the role of religion in dealing with the tension between centralization and diffusion of political power during times of socio-economic change. These epochs are significant because they formed the transition points between purely traditional Ashanti socio-economic and political life, and the era of European encroachment.

My approach to traditional religion here is positive. As Lucian Pye notes, "effective development can readily take place if there is a happy congruence between particular themes in the traditional culture and the attitudinal requirements of a modern system."[7] I argue that Nkrumah realized that there was such a coincidence in Ghana and utilized it.

Nature of Akan Religion and Politics

My specimen for this analysis is Akan religious life and thought. The Akans form the largest ethnic stock in modern Ghana. They inhabit the southern,central, and southeastern portions of Ghana.   There is

also a large kin group in Cote d'Voire. The Ashanti form the largest group among the Akans. The other Akan groups are the Akuapem, Akim, Akwamu, Denkyira, Wassaw, and Brong.

Agnes Aidoo has advanced a persuasive analysis of order and conflict[8] among the Ashantis during times of social, political, and economic stress. Specifically, she describes how the "ideology of the Golden Stool" and the position of its occupant, the Asantehene, held the Ashanti empire together and enabled it to achieve a relatively high degree of stability.

Aidoo rejects the orthodox theories of society used to study conflict and change in Africa: dynamic balance, Marxian, and unique culture models. She opts for a processual model which "stresses the interest adjustments that individuals and groups continually make to significant social and economic changes occurring in their society."[9] She identifies three levels of political instability that characterized socio-economic and political change in Ashanti political history. The three levels are apical, intermediate, and radical.[10] According to Aidoo, apical conflict occurred within the "apex of the social structure," a power struggle among the royal family for political control. The intermediate level primarily dealt with economic change. People in this group of the social structure grew wealthy at some point and began to seek a piece of the political pie. Radical consciousness occurred at the "bottom of the social structure." Those in this last group seek a complete overhaul of the existing order in times of enormous social stress.[11] What held all the interest groups together was religion, specifically the "ideology of the golden stool" which operated like glue to hold the opposing groups together and yet offered room for change.

The much celebrated Golden Stool of Ashanti is believed to have descended from the skies in the 17th century through the incantations of Okomfo Anokye, chief priest of King Osei Tutu. The stool is believed to be representative of the very fabric of the Ashanti nation and the unity and authority of the ruler, the *Asantehene*. It is described as being 2 feet long and 1 foot wide. Among the objects strapped to it are cast gold effigies of defeated warriors used as bells, one gold and two brass cast bells, and precious beads. It is said that the stool is never allowed to touch the ground.[12]

According to Ashanti tradition, on the occasion of the descent of the Golden Stool, Okomfo Anokye is said to have given a number of laws to the Ashanti nation. This made the stool the ultimate sanction of laws in the land.

The context and purpose of the Golden Stool were to provide continuity and change while maintaining stability at a time of internal and external conflict. Internal conflict involved issues of succession to the throne as well as challenges to the political order from new and powerful socio-economic classes. External conflict had to do with the encroachment of the British Empire on Ashanti's economic and political lives. Aidoo describes the integrative mechanisms as:

Harmony and concord at the apex of power was...only achieved through the process of astute political management by Osei Tutu; his priest-advisor, Okomfo Anokye; and their successors. They worked out a constitution which imposed restrictions on the "amanhene" and other subordinate chiefs in the political pyramid. The whole arrangement was then sealed in a familier religious bond. Thus, the "amanhene" had to swear allegiance to the "asantehene" after they had been selected by their own royal lineages and states. In the ceremony of allegiance, they were bound by oath to the sacred and mystical golden stool ("asikadwa") which embodied the ultimate religious sanction of the king's power. This allegiance was reaffirmed every year during the elaborate politico-religious festival of "odwira" held in Kumase.[13]

Among these sanctions were the following described by Kyerematen:

It is sacrilege for any other person, within or without Ashanti, to make another Golden Stool or to decorate a stool or any other King's seat with gold. Any such stool or seat should be seized....Only the King has the power of life or death. Hence, manslaughter or murder were challenges to his authority, punishable by death.[14]

The powerful, living presence of the Golden Stool in Ashanti life and thought is further explained by Kyerematen when he notes that:

It is treated as a living being, and is named (after the manner of an Akan child) from the day of the week on which it was "born": hence it is known as Sika Dwa Kofi, "The Golden Stool born on Friday." It is fed at regular intervals according to the Akan calender, and the cycle of Adae festivals is linked with this. The food prescribed comprises brown sheep, yam and liquor. If it were left hungry, the stool,and the nation it represented, would be considered in danger of dying.[15]

Stool ideology is central in Akan political culture. Among the Akan, there are royal stools called *Akongua Tumtum* (Black Stool) or *Nananom Agua* (Ancestral Stool). The stools are believed to embody the *Sunsum* (spirit) of the ancestors. They form the living symbols of their presence. The occupant does not own the stool. He holds it in trust for the ancestors. So it is said that *ote Nananom Agua so* (s/he occupies the ancestral stool). The stool is so central in traditional political structure that its occupant assumes religious qualities that, in turn, confer political authority. Busia sums up the nature of chiefly authority:

> From the moment that the chief is enstooled, his person becomes sacred. This is emphasized by taboos. He may not strike, or be struck by anyone, lest the ancestors bring misfortune upon the tribe. He may never walk bare-footed, lest when the sole of his foot touches the ground some misfortune befall the community. He should walk with care lest he stumble. If he does stumble, the expected calamity has to be averted with a sacrifice. His buttocks may not touch the ground; that again would bring misfortune. All these taboos remind the chief and everybody else that he occupies a sacred position. He is the occupant of the stool of the ancestors (*ote* nananom akonwa so). For this reason, he is treated with the greatest veneration.[16]

Thus, the chief is not only a political leader but also a religious leader. In fact, all authority that enables him to function in a chiefly capacity is based on religion. Asare Opoku offers a further insight into chiefly authority:

> The Akan chief has to officiate at the Adae Festival, celebrated twice every 42 days. As servant to the ancestors, he offers them food and drink. The chief also plays a principal role in the annual 'Odwira' festival and makes periodic sacrifices to national gods. In times of emergency or misfortune too, the chief has to perform special sacrifices.[17]

If the chief occupies a sacred position, how does this sacred authority translate into secular rule? What are the expectations among the people? The best illustration of the sacred nature of chief's secular authority is the *ntam* , oath, sworn by the chief at the time of enstoolment. Asare Opoku explains:

> The 'ntam' provides the stamp of legality for their election and installation. The 'ntam' is binding on both the chief and the people

and its violation spells disaster for the state. The newly-enstooled chief takes the sword and swears to the people and the people swear to him.[18]

By this act of ntam a bond is established between the leader and the led which, if it becomes unglued, spells trouble in the state:

"Ntam is the opposite of "tam", lift. It therefore literally means that which is heavy and must not be lifted....The responsibility is enormous, and the chief must not attempt to upset things.[19]

These dynamics of chiefly rule, the significance of the golden stool, and the Ashanti capital, Kumasi, are similar to what Geertz observed about the Hinduized states of Indonesia. Geertz lifts up the concept of "the exemplary center",

the notion that the capital city (or more accurately the king's palace) was at once a microcosm of the supernatural order—"an image of... the universe on a smaller scale—and the material embodiment of political order." The capital was not merely the nucleus, the engine, or the pivot of the state; it 'was' the state.[20]

Similarly, Geertz's idea of a "tangible paragon" offered by the exemplary center adds more meaning to chiefly rule in Ghana.

Spiritual exellence and political eminence were fused. Magical power and executive influence flowed in a single stream outward and downward from the king through the descending ranks of his staff and whatever lesser courts were subordinate to him, draining out finally into the spiritually and politically residual peasant mass.[21]

Chiefly Authority and Nkrumah's Leadership

I have dwelt at length on the religious dynamic evidenced in chieftaincy in Ghana in order to demonstrate that one way to understand Nkrumah's leadership style is to perceive him as resymbolizing Ghanaian traditional politics. By resymbolization I mean his ability to step back skillfully into the past through strategic wisdom to retrieve symbols with which his followers could easily identify.

In his effort at national integration, therefore, Nkrumah employed the most central religious symbol in Ghanaian culture, chieftaincy.

Religion can only exercise a powerful and effective function if its symbols are rooted in the dominant culture. Because Nkrumah perceived his leadership challenge in terms of national integration he cast himself as a chief with all the rites, pomp, ceremony, and splendor connected to the office of a chief. In fact, in 1962 Nkrumah got himself enstooled chief of Nsaeum, a town in Nzema where he claimed royalty.[22] He was also made honorary chief of Wenchi in June, 1958 with the stool name, Anye Amoampong.

The close interface of religion and politics has enabled traditional politics to develop political institutions capable of effective change. By employing the time-honored tradition of chieftaincy in his integrative revolution, Nkrumah was utilizing an all-inclusive aspect of Ghanaian life and thought. However, at issue also were two other religious traditions in Ghana, Christianity and Islam. How did these religions function in the integrative process?

Christianity, Islam, and Ghanaian Politics

It was the intertwining of religion and life in traditional Ghana that determined how new forces such as Euro-christianity and Islam were encountered. Islamic advances in Africa in general and Ghana in particular, have not provided serious challenges to traditional religions. In sub-Saharan Africa the Islamic mode of transmission or missionizing made it easy for that religion to find a home among the people. Liebenow's observation sums up the general process in sub-Saharan Africa:

> The Islamization of the masses remained a veneer that did not penetrate deeply into the social system. Many traditional chiefs in the Sahel Region below the Sahara found it convenient in the interest of trade or political survival to embrace Islam to satisfy their external challengers while continuing to observe traditional rituals for the benefit of their internal constituents.[23]

Christianity's arrival is a different story. Its contribution to nation-building in Africa was not always an intended consequence. The religious foundation of African life and thought, including political authority was greatly undermined by the Christian attack on African religions and African culture as a whole. Christianity was therefore a

conflictual social force. In addition, the Christian worldview based on the western dichotomy between sacred and profane cut across the African view based on the fusion of the two. Mission education gave a boost to nationalism. The products of mission schools emerged as a new class, educated and politically conscious enough to question the colonial arrangement. Christianity was associated with social and political modernization. But the political consequences of Christian missionizing were unintended. Education was initially aimed at "civilizing" natives and to make them docile subjects. There was thus a partnership between the colonial government and missionary bodies in this civilizing enterprise.[24]

Nkrumah had to contend with both traditional religions and the "New Gods" of Islam and Christianity, but he managed to transcend religious particularisms in order to create a pluralism that could support his integrative revolution. He skillfully did this by using the institution of chieftaincy and all the religio-political traditions that accompanied it. This adoption became one of the bases of the long-standing conflict between Nkrumah and the church.

Political History and Ethnicity in Ghana

Nkrumah took great pride in his own ethnic background to the point of having himself enstooled as a chief. To understand his efforts toward national integration we need to understand the history behind Ghana's ethnic groups.

Ethnicity in Ghana can best be described by this imaginary dialogue: The baby millipede to its mother: "With so many legs, which one do I move first?" The mother's response: "Just move, child, move"![25] National integration is a process of bringing together culturally and socially discrete groups into a single unit and establishing a national identity.[26] Nkrumah identified this process as a crucial challenge, because ethnocentricism and tribalism cut across his vision of national unity. What, then, is the historical dynamic behind ethnicity in Ghana that lends itself to fragmentation and primordial attachments? An understanding of this dynamic will help us to see how political alliances formed in Ghana during the era of nationalism. It will also help to clarify why Nkrumah sought common and familiar religious themes, language, and rituals to weld these heterogenous groups together.

Ethnic Origins

Of all the theories advanced to explain the historical origins of the various ethnic kinships in Ghana, J.B. Danquah's account seems most convincing. He relates the predominating Akan group with the ancient Western Sudanese Kingdom of Ghana which had a highly developed culture and, for a considerable time, African kings and queens.[27] Attacked by the Berbers in c.1077, the people of ancient Ghana moved south. They became the forebears of the present Akans. Ward disagrees with Danquah on the date. He points out that by the time the Ghana Kingdom was destroyed, the Akans were already entrenched in present day Ghana, and that they were of Mandingo origin.[28] They both agree, however, that there were extensive migrations in the thirteenth century that brought most of the ethnic groups to present day Ghana.

The first group consisted of the Guans and related groups. They came down the Volta valley probably as early as c.1200 and occupied a crescent of land stretching from Bole, through Salaga, Karachi, Anum, and Accra, as far as Winneba.

The second wave, the ancestors of the Fanti who now occupy most of the southwestern coastal area, probably came down the Offin and Pra rivers arriving in c.1300, thence spreading eastward through Cape Coast until they came in contact with the Guan tribe.[29]

A third wave, the ancestors of the Ashantis, came straight down between earlier settlers, occupying the present Ashanti and Akim areas. The Akwamus, a branch of this group, came into contact with the Accra peoples (Gas) as late as 1600. By the middle of the seventeenth century, the Ashantis, under their king Osei Tutu and his priest, Okomfo Anokye, had become so powerful as to bring most of these ethnic groups under them. They imposed their language, culture, and politics upon them. There was a strategic policy of intentional assimilation whereby it was taboo to trace the origins of those brought into the imperial fold through conquest. This policy might explain why the Akan language and culture cover about 65 percent of Ghana today.

In the Northern Territories, the Moshi followed closely behind the Akans from the Sudan. They conquered the indigenous population, split into three groups, and established the additional kingdoms of Manyonesi and Dagomba under the rule of sons or relatives of the leaders. The Gonja Kingdom was the last in the series that came out of the Moshi split. It had a close alliance with Akan elements in the southern tip of the north. These groups originally brought the Islamic ·

influence in the Gold Coast through their close religious and economic interaction with the Ashanti kingdom.[30]

Because of how these groups originated, there were alliances as well as enmities among them which have survived into modern Ghanaian politics beginning with the Nkrumah era. A few illustrations may suffice. First of all, all the major ethnic groups had their leaders or clan heads. A clan, *Abusua* in Akan, includes all who acknowledge a common founding ancestor. All the individuals in the clan form a lineage, headed by the eldest male member, *Abusuapanyin.*

The lineage heads were also spiritual heads, and elected the kings who sat on the ancestral stools. There were cycles of migrations caused by wars, famine, and economic necessities. There were various alliances (holy and unholy ones) to fight common enemies. Alliances were often through intermarriages and mentorship of would-be kings (royal children) in the courts of other great kings. King Osei Tutu, for example, was raised in the courts of the king of Denkyira, the most powerful ruler of the then Akan world. There were alliances between the Akuapems and Akyems, Ashantis and Kwahus, Gas and Dangbes. Even in these modern times, the traditional ruler of Akuapem state regards the ruler of Akyem state as a maternal uncle. The two states are strong allies.

Even though the Fanti and Ashanti came from one ethnic background and thus possessed similar lineages and customs and organizations, they became traditional enemies around the eighteenth century. This drove the Fantis closer to the British for protection, and opened the way for colonization. Commenting on this cultural dislocation, Claridge noted:

> Taken man for man, the Fanti is probably nearly as good as the Ashanti. The Ashanti, however, have built up a splendid military organization, to the perfections of which everything else has been sacrificed, and they have learned to rely on themselves and put national interest before their own. The Fantis, on the other hand, have suffered from their long contact with the Europeans. Their surroundings and their mode of life have to some extent, become artificial and they have been taught to rely upon the protection of a stronger race, rather than upon their own effort.[31]

This observation does not necessarily overlook Fanti contributions to Ghanaian nationalism. After all, the Fanti Confederacy of 1871 was the first organized nationalist group. It sought to safeguard local

interests against certain provisions of the Bond of 1844 which formally made the Gold Coast a British colony. However, Claridge's observation established the kind of long standing animosity between the Ashantis and the coastal people, particularly the Fantis. The Fantis were British allies who fought the Ashantis until 1901. Nkrumah took pride in his own ethnic background and lineage; Nzema a lineage within the Akan group, but closer to the Fanti than the Ashanti.[32] It is no wonder that he faced a difficult task in his efforts to be accepted by the Ashantis as a national leader. For Ashantis have traditionally found it taboo to accept any other political authority other than the Asantehene's.

Religion and Ethnicity

Patrick Ryan has analyzed the relationship of ethnic migrations to the history of religion in West Africa, in an attempt to locate a unified "African religious experience".[33] He identifies the first historical phase as a "pre-migrancy faith" in which people in a given area had not been exposed to any other religion apart from their ancestral ones.

The second phase, "post-migrancy faith," Ryan argues, was the result of the intermarriage between the locals and the migrants. This resulted in the sharing and fusion of religion, and hence in a "great cultural and religious change both for the migrants and for the people among whom they settled."[34]

Ryan also cites Robin Horton's analysis of religious fusion in Africa to explain the penetration of new religions into the African worldview. Horton suggested that in Africa it has been precisely the widening of personal horizons caused by the experience of migration, trade, travel, and invasion—quite apart from Muslim and Christian influence—that has directed Africans' attention away from the lesser spirits to the God who superintends them. According to Horton:

> The extent to which any population actively worships its high god is partly determined by the degree of its active contact with the wider world outside the microcosm.[35]

While there is a great amount of truth in this line of argument, there is also the danger of reaffirming the ethnocentric attitude that has led to the perception that the idea of the high God, *Onyankopon* (in Akan), is foreign to Africa and that new religious realities and experience

brought that idea. Specifically, Christian influences are cited. I maintain that the idea of a high God was not a foreign idea. Rather, African traditional religions by nature, absorb and reject new religious experiences and expressions in ways that are meaningful to them. Fernandez perceives African religions in terms of their internal logic of the perpetuation. He therefore, rejects the kind of comparision in which,

> more and more we tend to emphasize the external stimuli and note the system's response to them, and less and less to formulate any intensive study of the system itself...the "intervening variable",— the religious system itself—and the transformations characteristic of it.[36]

In the Ghanaian context in which Nkrumah's leadership is tested, Geertz offers a rather more insightful way to understand how the various religious traditions provided the sense-making symbols for Nkrumah's integrative revolution. For Geertz, a religious system is a "cluster of sacred symbols, woven into some sort of ordered whole."

> For those who are commited to it, such a religious system seems to mediate genuine knowlege, knowledge of the essential conditions in terms of which life must, of necessity, be lived.[37]

Indigenous Ghanaian religions co-existed with the new universalistic ones, Christianity and Islam, as people tried to reaffirm themselves in the midst of social change. Because of this attitude toward religion, particularly its close interface with culture, it was a readily available tool to integrate diverse ethnic groups, including the predominantly Islamic north. Transreligiosity helps to explain how there had been a long marriage between the Ashanti religion and culture and Islam. These two ethnic groups have interacted religiously across the centuries. Islamic symbols, rituals, and myths are readily utilized by Ashantis in their day-to-day activities, side by side with Ashanti religious traditions as well as Christian forms. Coastal groups also contended with indigenous religions and Christianity. Busia's observation about the Fantis helps to define this transreligious trend that I argue is central in Nkrumah's overall approach to leadership and in his employment of the religious dynamic. I cite this and then move on to consider Nkrumah's portrait as a national leader.

As one watches the daily lives and activities of the people, and takes account of the rites connected with marriage, birth, death, widowhood, harvest or installations to traditional offices, one learns that a great deal of the normal communal activities of the converts lie outside their Christian activities, and that for all their influence, the Christian churches are still alien institutions intruding upon, but not integrated with social institutions.[38]

With this kind of religious dynamic, Nkrumah had available to him a resource to draw on with indigenous meaning. Nkrumah's use of symbolic and inspirational aspects of ethnic life, especialy the institution of chieftaincy, should be understood in this light.

Notes

1. Following Bellah, I understand civil religion to mean a set of beliefs and practices designed to inspire and sustain the nation-state. Because these beliefs and practices themselves draw inspiration from, and at the same time transcend all sectarian religious commitments or groups, Nkrumah's neotraditionalism and cultural synthesis offered a fertile climate for a new political culture to emerge: See Robert Bellah, "Civil Religion in America," in Russell E. Richey and Donald G. Jones, eds., *American Civil Religion* (New York: Harper and Row, 1974).

2. Chancellor Williams, "Africa," in Joseph S. Roucek, ed, *Contemporary Sociology* (New York: Philosophical Library, Inc., 1958) 1088.

3. V. Y. Mudimbe, *The Invention of Africa* (Bloomington: University of Indiana Press, 1988) 45.

4. Geertz, *Interpretation*, 124.

5. James Fernandez, *Bwiti: An Ethnography of the Religious Imagination in Africa* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982) 8.

6. Christopher Dawson, *Religion and Culture* (New York: Meridian Books, 1952) 54.

7. Lucian W. Pye, *Aspects of Political Development* (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1966) 92.

8. Agnes A. Aidoo, "Order and Conflict in the Asante Empire: A Study in Interest Group Relations" (*African Studies Review*, vol. xx, no. 1 April, 1977) 1.

9. Aidoo, "Order and Conflict" 4.

10. Aidoo, Ibid, 9.

11. Aidoo, *Ibid*, 9.

12. K.A. Busia, *The Position of the Chief in the Modern Political System of Ashanti* (London: Oxford University Press,1951) Also see A. Kyerematen, "The Royal Stools of Ashanti" (Africa, Vol. xxxix, No.1, January 1969) 1-9.

13. Aidoo, "Order and Conflict", 10. "Amanhene" is the functional equivalent of divisional heads with the "Asantehene" serving as the head of state and commander in chief.

14. Kyerematen, "Royal Stools," 4-5.

15. Kyerematen, Royal Stools," 4.

16. K.A. Busia, *The Position of the Chief in the Modern Political System of Ashanti* (London:Oxford University Press, 1951) 26-27. Also see A. Kyerematen, "The Royal Stools", 1-9.

17. Kofi Asare Opoku, *West African Traditional Religion* (London:FEP International Private Ltd., 1978) 12.

18. Asare Opoku, "Traditional Foundations of Development," Paper presented at the 40th Annual New Year School (December 27, 1988-January 4,1989) 16-17.

19. Asare Opoku, *Ibid*, 17.

20. Geertz, Ibid, 222.

21. Geertz, Ibid, 223

22. Kwame Nkrumah, *Ghana* 25. Nkrumah discloses that his mother had told him on the night he left for the United States of his "claim to two stools or chieftaincies in the country, those of Nsaeum in Wassaw Fiase, and Dadieso in Aowin." Apparently he eventually inherited the stool at Nsaeum.

23. J. Gus Liebenow, *African Politics:Crises and Challenges* (Bloomington:Indiana University Press,1986) 82.

24. See J.S. Pobee, *Kwame Nkrumah and the Church in Ghana:1949-1966* (Accra-Ghana:Asempa Publishers,1988) 89.

25. "A Parable on African Unity," by Julius Nyere. Quoted in Arnold Rivkin, *Nation-Building in Africa* 14.

26. See Finkle and Gable, *Political Development and Social Change* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1966) 551.

27. J.B. Danquah, "The Culture of the Akan," *Africa* 22, No. 4 (October 1952).

28. W. E .F. Ward, *A History of the Gold Coast* (London:1948) 31.

29. My father being of the Guan stock (Anum), I have noticed tremendous similarities between the Guans and the Efutu (Winneba) in language and culture, which gives credence to their close historical origins.

30. See Apter, *Ghana in Transition* 22-23.

31. W. W. Claridge, *A History of the Gold Coast and Ashanti* (London,1915) Vol.1, 182. Quoted in Apter, *Transition* 24.

32. Nkrumah, *Ghana*, 3

33. Patrick Ryan,S.J., "Is It Possible to Construct a Unified History of Religion in West Africa?" in *Universitas*, 8 (n.d.) 98-112.

34. Ryan, *Ibid*, 99.

35. Robin Horton, "The High God: A Comment on Father O' Connel's Paper," in *Man* 62 (1962) No. 219. Ryan, Ibid.,100

36. James Fernandez, "Microcosmogony and Modernization in African Religious Movements", Seminar Paper, Center for Developing-Area Studies, McGill University (Fall 1967) 4

37. Geertz, *Interpretation* 129.

38. K.A. Busia, *Report on a Social Survey of Sekondi-Takoradi* (London:Crown Agents for the Colonies, 1950) 79